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Australia has established a compulsory pilotage regime for the Torres Strait and Inner Route of 
the Great Barrier Reef. The introduction of the regime for the Torres Strait was controversial. It 
was opposed by other countries on the grounds that compulsory pilotage in the strait was 
contrary to the UNCLOS regime of transit passage through straits used for international 
navigation. Australia has now submitted a proposal to the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) to extend its mandatory ship reporting system for the Great Barrier Reef to include the 
southernmost part of the Great Barrier Reef Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA). These 
developments are illustrative of the trend towards greater coastal State regulation of navigation 




Increased coastal State regulation of navigation in adjacent waters is becoming more common as 
concern grows both for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and for the 
growing number of marine accidents leading to serious pollution of that environment. The most 
notorious incident indicating these trends was the Exxon Valdez grounding in Alaskan waters in 
1989. This led to the introduction by the United States of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA90), 
which established a comprehensive regime for dealing with ship-sourced marine pollution in the 
adjacent waters of the United States. 
 
The Exxon Valdez incident was followed by several serious pollution incidents in European 
waters, including the tanker Braer wrecked off the southwest coast of Shetland in 1993, and the 
foundering of the tanker Erika off France in 1999 and of the tanker Prestige off Spain in 2002. 
These incidents have all served to increase the sensitivity of coastal States to the risks of ship-
sourced marine pollution in their adjacent waters, and have led to moves towards greater 
regulation of shipping in these waters. Human error was a key factor in all of these incidents, 




The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 provides the framework for coastal 
State regulation of activities in adjacent waters. However, UNCLOS was formulated in a period 
                                                 




when there was less concern for the health of the marine environment than there is at present and 
modern international environmental law was underdeveloped. Norms and principles for the 
preservation and protection of the marine environment have multiplied exponentially over the 
last two decades. 
 
All State parties to UNCLOS have a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment,2 and UNCLOS Part XII sets out comprehensive rights and obligations for the 
preservation and protection of the marine environment. However, the navigational regimes in 
UNCLOS provide an example of the relatively lower level of concern for the marine 
environment that was current in the 1970s when UNCLOS was being negotiated. The regimes of 
straits‟ transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) passage apply to “all ships and 
aircraft”,3 and there is no clear right of the coastal or archipelagic State to prevent the passage of 
a vessel that might be perceived to be a serious threat to the marine environment. 
 
Aldo Chircop had addressed the issue in the context of a ship in distress seeking a place of refuge 
in a strait used for international navigation concluding that: 
 
While respecting the intention of the UNCLOS III negotiators to protect freedom of 
navigation through straits, one should be wary of applying too restrictive an interpretation 
that might not permit the coastal state to intervene to prevent a casualty from harming vital 
interests. It is possible to argue that international straits are not exempted from the right of 
protection of the coastal state under general international law and the precautionary 
principle under international law apply.4 
 
Many international conventions, as well as the desire of coastal States around the world to 
increase their controls over navigation in their adjacent waters, reflect the precautionary 
approach to preserving and protecting the marine environment. The second generation of 
environment conventions followed after UNCLOS. These reflect increased awareness of threats 
to the marine environment and incorporate concepts developed after UNCLOS, such as 
sustainable development and the conservation of biological diversity, as well as the 
precautionary principle.5 
 
The precautionary principle has its origins in the Rio Declaration,6 one of the outcomes of the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 1992 and now 
constituting a customary norm of international law.7 The precautionary approach reflects the 
notion that it is not necessary to await conclusive, scientific or technical evidence of the risks of 
                                                 
2 UNCLOS, Article 192. 
3 In accordance with UNCLOS Articles 38(1) and 53(2) respectively. 
4 A. Chircop, “Law of the Sea and International Environmental Law Considerations for Places of Refuge for Ships in 
Need of Assistance,” in A. Chircop and O. Linden, eds., Places of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns 
of a Maritime Custom , Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 246. 
5 R.R.Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The law of the sea, 3rd edition, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 336 
6 (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 818. 
7 R. Rayfuse, “International Environmental Law”, Chapter 14 in S. Blay, R. Piotrowicz and M. Tsamenyi, eds, Public 
International Law- An Australian Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 360 – 1. 
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damage to the marine environment before taking preventive action. 8 The precautionary approach 
post-dates UNCLOS by over a decade and its acceptance is a clear demonstration that the world 
has changed with regard to the balance between freedoms of navigation and marine 
environmental protection. 
 
Both Indonesia and Singapore backed Malaysia's 
insistence that Japanese plutonium shipments should not be routed through the Malacca Strait for 
fear of the environmental risks involved.10 
 
The concern is also evident in the Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of 
PSSAs adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 2005.11 These guidelines 
acknowledge that with the increase in global trade, shipping activities are also increasing with 
greater potential for adverse effects and damage to the marine environment. The guidelines are 
far more detailed and “liberal” in their approach than UNCLOS Article 211(6) reflecting the 
more sophisticated and comprehensive scientific understanding of the dangers posed by ships to 
the marine environment than was the case when UNCLOS was negotiated.12 
 
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) are important measures that may be adopted by a 
coastal State as a means of regulating navigation in adjacent waters. PSSAs are designated by the 
IMO, which must be satisfied that the areas concerned require special protection because of their 
significance for recognised ecological, socio-economic and technical reasons and vulnerable to 
international maritime activities. The kinds of measure that might be taken by the coastal State 
include the designation of areas to be avoided, the adoption of vessel traffic systems, speed 
restrictions and compulsory pilotage. Following the Braer, Prestige and Erika incidents, a 
proposal was tabled by several European States to have an extensive area of the north-eastern 
Atlantic declared a PSSA.13 The initial proposal was significantly watered down but restrictions 
on single-hull tankers and a mandatory ship reporting system have been implemented. However, 
differences still remain on the extent and effectiveness of PSSAs and the “PSSA discourse in the 
IMO is likely to remain contentious”.14 
                                                 
8 E. Gold, Gard Handbook on Protection of the Marine Environment, 3
rd
 ed., Arendal: Gard AS, 2006, p. 62. 
9 Gold, Gard Handbook, p. 357. 
10 J. M. Van Dyke, “Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium under International Law,” Ocean Development and 
International Law 24 (1993), pp. 399–403. 
11 Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, adopted by IMO 
Assembly Resolution A.982(24), 1 December 2005 [hereinafter Revised Guidelines]. 
12 West European Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) – Comments made by the Division for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea of the United Nations (DOALAS) in connection with issues raised in document LEG 87/16/1, IMO Doc. 
LEG 87/16/1, Annex 7 (23 October 2003). 
13 J. Roberts, M. Tsamenyi, T. Workman and L. Johnson, “The Western European proposal: a “political sensitive sea 
area”, Marine Policy, Vol., 29, 2005, pp. 431-440. 
14 A. Chircop, “The Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas; A New Layer in the Regime for Marine 




Increased Regulation in Australia 
 
While customarily a strong supporter of the freedoms of navigation, Australia has been 
prominent among the coastal States seeking to increase the regulation of navigation in adjacent 
waters, particularly with compulsory pilotage and ship reporting requirements through Torres 
Strait and the Inner Route of the Great Barrier Reef. Many of the materials listed in the 
International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code are carried through these waters, either 
in containers or as bulk cargoes. They include crude oil, petroleum products, bulk fertilizer and 
mineral concentrates. Most of these substances, as well as bunker fuel oil, would have significant 
impact on the marine environment if they were released as a consequence of a marine accident. 
 
The Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef are extremely sensitive marine habitats that could easily 
be severely damaged as a result of a marine accident. Both have been designated as PSSAs by 
the IMO. The Great Barrier Reef PSSA was approved by the IMO in 1990 along with a 
recommendation that IMO Member States should inform ships flying their flags to comply with 
the system of pilotage introduced by Australia.15 That system became a compulsory one for the 
Inner Route of the Great Barrier Reef from Cape York to 16
o 
40‟ South (just north of Cairns), 
and this was accepted without challenge by other countries. 
 
With regard to the Torres Strait, the IMO adopted a resolution in 1987 promoting voluntary 
pilotage in the Strait.16 This was extended further with a 1991 resolution, superseding the earlier 
one, recommending that certain classes of vessel use a pilot when passing through the Torres 
Strait and Great North East Channel.17 While these recommendatory regimes were initially 
reasonably successful, non-compliance increased significantly. Data from 1995 and 2001 shows 
that while 70% of vessels on eastbound voyages were taking a pilot in 1995; this figure had 
fallen to 32% by 2001.18 Similar figures for westbound voyages were 55% and 38.5%. These 
figures equate to about 500 un-piloted transits each year.19 As a consequence, Australia and 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) agreed that the risks of a major shipping incident in the Strait leading 
to serious pollution of the area were unacceptably high, and jointly proposed an extension to the 
existing Great Barrier Reef PSSA to include the waters of the Torres Strait (see Figure 1). This 
was approved in July 2005 through a resolution regarding governments informing ships flying 
their flags to comply with the system of pilotage introduced by Australia.20 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regime Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 607. 
15 Protection of the Great Barrier Reef Region, IMO Resolution MEPC.45(30), adopted 16 November 1990. 
16 Use of Pilotage Services in the Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef Area, IMO Resolution A.619(15), adopted 
16 November 1987. 
17 Use of Pilotage Services in the Torres Strait and the Great North East Channel, IMO Resolution A.710(17), 
adopted November 1991. 
18 Torres Strait PSSA Associated Protective Measures – Compulsory Pilotage, submitted by Australia and Papua New 
Guinea, IMO document LEG 89/15 (24 August 2004), para. 6. 
19 J. Roberts, Marine Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation – The Application and Future 
Development of the IMO’s Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept, Berlin: Springer, 2007, p. 156. 
20 IMO Resolution MEPC.133(53), supra note 3. 
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On the basis of the July 2005 resolution, Australia amended domestic legislation in 2006 to 
specify a new compulsory pilotage area for the Torres Strait and Great North East Channel.21 
This issue was hotly debated at the IMO, and the extended pilotage regime was formally 
protested by the United States and Singapore.22 However, Australia and PNG, as the two littoral 
states, believe that compulsory pilotage is necessary to protect sensitive marine habitats in the 
Torres Strait and is in accordance with international law.23 They consider it an appropriate and 
necessary associated protective measure (APM) for the PSSA to help ensure navigational safety 
in the area, and thereby reduce the risks of maritime accidents leading to marine pollution. 
 
See Figure 1 _ PSSA and Shipping Routes in the Torres Strait 
 
The shipping route through this area constitutes a strait used for international navigation to which 
the transit passage regime in Part III of UNCLOS applies.  The route passes through the PSSA 
designated and approved by the IMO in 2005.24 Thus the area is one that needs special protection 
through action by the IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological or socio-
economic or scientific reasons, and which may be vulnerable to damage by international 
maritime activities.25 
 
Australia‟s domestic legislation recognises the principle of sovereign immunity for warships and 
government vessels not employed on commercial service. The legislation also includes a system 
of pilotage exemption for masters of ships that use the Torres Strait on a regular basis. Other 
countries and international shipping organizations, including INTERTANKO and the 
International Chamber of Shipping, protested these regulations at the 55th Session of IMO‟s 
Marine Environment Protection Committee held in August 2006.26 
 
Australia has instituted measures to ensure that ships approaching the Torres Strait are notified 
well in advance of their approach of the need to take on a pilot when transiting the Torres Strait.  
Initially this is done using the Australian Ship Reporting System (AUSREP),27 which covers 
Australia‟s very large Search and Rescue Region. Their movements are then monitored within 
the Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef through the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Ship 
Reporting System (REEFREP), and the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Vessel Traffic 
                                                 
21 Australian Marine Notice 8/2006 and associated Marine Orders Part 54. 
22 R. C. Beckman, “PSSAs and Transit Passage – Australia‟s Pilotage System in the Torres Strait Challenges the IMO 
and UNCLOS,” Ocean Development and International Law 38(4) (2007), p. 337. 
23 A comprehensive discussion of the arguments for and against compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait may be found 
in Bateman and M. White “Compulsory Pilotage in the Torres Strait – Overcoming Unacceptable Risks to a Sensitive 
Marine Environment”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 40, N, pp. 184-203 
24 Designation of the Torres Strait as an Extension of the Great Barrier Reef Particularly Sensitive Sea Area, 
adopted by IMO Resolution MEPC.133(53), 22 July 2005, available in Report of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee on its Fifty-Third Session, Annex 21, MEPC 53/24/Add.2 (1 August 2005). 
25 For the IMO definition of a PSSA, see Revised Guidelines. 
26 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its Fifty-fifth Session, IMO Doc. 55/23 (16 October 
2006), especially at pp. 52–54. 
27 A full description of AUSREP may be found in Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Seafarers Handbook 
(Wollongong, Australian Hydrographic Services, 2007), pp. 153 -157. 
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Service (REEFVTS), the vessel traffic and information system for these shipping routes.28 Ships 
planning to enter Australia‟s EEZ are also required to report their intentions and are tracked 
using the Australian Maritime Information System (AMIS) managed by the Border Protection 
Command. 
 
As a vessel approaches the Torres Strait, its Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions 
are detected by AIS shore stations and later used to enhance tracking along with shore-based 
radar. Within the vicinity of the Prince of Wales Channel, it will also be identified by a remotely 
operated video camera on Hammond Rock at the narrowest part of the channel. Should a vessel 
not take a pilot and fail to identify itself, it will be positively identified by surveillance aircraft 
and subject to legal proceedings when it next enters an Australian port. No attempt will be made 




The Torres Strait is one of the most hazardous and navigationally difficult stretches of water in 
the world routinely used by international shipping. Geographically, the Torres Strait comprises 
the waters lying between Cape York Peninsula in the extreme north of Australia and Papua New 
Guinea. These waters are shallow, usually no deeper than about 13 metres, and strewn with 
numerous islands, small islets, reefs and shoals. The northern half of the Strait is only navigable 
by vessels with a very shallow draught, and deep draught vessels are restricted to using narrow 
channels in the southern part of the Strait between the various islands off Cape York, principally 
the Prince of Wales Channel immediately north of Hammond Island. 
 
Navigation in the Torres Strait is extremely hazardous. Apart from the complex topography of 
the area and relatively shallow waters, the tidal regime in the Strait is highly complex and 
variable.29 Tidal streams can exceed seven knots. This is an area of confluence between two 
major ocean systems. Tides in the Coral Sea and Pacific Ocean are semidiurnal while tides in the 
Indian Ocean are diurnal, causing tides in the Strait to fall into no coherent pattern.30 The 
Australian Seafarers Handbook warns vessels planning a passage through the Torres Strait that 
„[A]ccurate calculations and local knowledge are necessary to establish a tidal window for any 
particular day and draught‟.31 Currents are also very strong, and visibility can be impaired by 
flash squalls and storms. Radar propagation is frequently degraded throughout the year due to 
either heavy precipitation during the “wet” season, or sea mist caused by the strong, gusty 
southeast trade winds in the “dry” season.32  All in all, it is one of the most dangerous stretches 
of water in the world routinely used by large vessels. 
                                                 
28 REEFREP is a mandatory ship reporting system adopted by the IMO in 1996. In December 2004, REEFREP was 
enhanced with the introduction of a vessel traffic service and became the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait Vessel 
Traffic Service (REEFVTS). Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Seafarers Handbook (Wollongong, Australian 
Hydrographic Services, 2007), p. 157. 
29 R. Babbage, “The Strategic Significance of Torres Strait,” Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 61, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1990, p. 3. 
30 S. B. Kaye, The Torres Strait, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), p. 4.  
31 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Seafarers Handbook , p. 111. 
32 RAN Hydrographer, “The Meteorological Effects on Maritime Operations conducted in the Torres Strait Region,” in 




International shipping passing through the Torres Strait uses the Prince of Wales Channel. This 
passage is narrow, being only 800 metres wide at its narrowest point,33 and subject to very strong 
tidal streams. Most ships are bound to or from Australian ports and use the Inner Route of the 
Great Barrier Reef. However, ships bound to and from South Pacific ports use the Great North 
East Channel. As shown in Figure 1, ships using the Inner Route pass south-eastwards off Cape 
York while the vessels using the latter channel proceed north-eastwards towards Bramble Cay to 
enter the Coral Sea through Bligh Entrance. It is these latter vessels to which the straits‟ transit 
passage regime in UNCLOS applies. Ships using the Inner Route pass through Australia‟s 
internal waters. This means there are no law of the sea implications, and the passage of these 
ships does not constitute transit passage within the meaning of UNCLOS Article 38(2).34 
 
Information from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority shows that there were 3,187 piloted 
transits of the Great Barrier Reef Inner Route and Great North East Channel during the year 
ending 30 September 2007. One third (2,183 transits) used the Inner Route. Thus nearly nine 
ships per day passed through the Prince of Wales Channel while there were roughly three transits 
per day of the Great North East Channel and six piloted transits of the Inner Route. In the same 
period, there were 1,332 piloted transits of Hydrographers Passage, which is used in particular by 
bulk carriers carrying coal from ay Point and is subject to compulsory pilotage requirements. 
Mineral exports from Queensland ports are growing rapidly and these figures for piloted transits 
will have increased since 2007. 
 
Great Barrier Reef 
 
The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) is a vast system of coral reefs and related structures along the 
continental shelf of north-eastern Australia extending for 2,300 kilometres from Torres Strait to 
Lady Elliott Island off Bundaberg in Southeast Queensland. The World Heritage status of the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP) was confirmed in 1981 and it remains the largest 
World Heritage site in the world. 
 
There is now a comprehensive management regime in place for the GBR administered by the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, which is a joint agency of the Australian and 
Queensland Governments.35 It includes a zoning system, regulations for different activities, 
assessment processes, contingency plans for responding to oil spills, and so on. A major oil spill 
in the reef would cause catastrophic environmental damage. The impact of crude oil on 
mangroves in the Torres Strait was still evident some 27 years after a major spill in the Strait as a 
result of the grounding of the tanker Oceanic Grandeur. Following application by Australia, the 
GBRMP became the first area to be designated by the IMO as a PSSA.36 
 
                                                 
33 Routeing of Ships, Ship Reporting and Related Matters – Torres Strait PSSA Associated Protective Measure – 
Compulsory Pilotage, submitted by Australia and Papua New Guinea, 22 March 2004, IMO Doc. NAV 50/3, para. 2.2.5. 
34 Kaye, The Torres Strait, p. 125. 
35 The evolution of the management arrangements for the GBR is described in David Lawrence, Richard Kenchington, 
and Simon Woodley, The Great Barrier Reef: Finding the Right Balance, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2002. 
36 Churchill and Lowe, The law of the sea, p. 394. 
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Two routes are available for shipping passing along the Queensland coast: the Inner Route of the 
GBR and the Outer Route (see Figure 1). The Inner Route, as its name suggest, passes down and 
through parts of the GBR. North of Cairns, where the reef closes in close to the coast is 
navigationally intricate and subject to a compulsory pilotage regime that applies north from 
latitude 16
o
40‟ South off Cairns. South of Cairns, the reef diverges way from the coast, and 
although there are still numerous islands and reefs, navigation is relatively straightforward. The 
Inner Route is well charted and relatively heavily used by shipping. Various access routes, such 
as Hydrographers Passage, exist from the Pacific Ocean into the major Queensland ports of 
Cairns, Townsville, Gladstone and Mackay, and the coal ports of Abbott Point and Hay Point. 
 
The Outer Route is less well-used. Environmental groups over the years have proposed that 
shipping be banned from the Inner Route other than those vessels proceeding to a Queensland 
port. These proposals have been rejected on the grounds that an oil spill along that route would 
be much more difficult to control than one on the Inner Route and could lead to serious 
environmental damage to the outer edges of the GBR. 
 
The mandatory ship reporting system for the GBR is provided through REEFREP and the vessel 
traffic functions through REEFVTS. Under these arrangements, all ships over 50 metres in 
length; all oil tankers, liquefied gas carriers and chemical tankers; and ships engaged in towing 
with a tow over a certain size are required to participate in these systems. The compulsory 
pilotage and ship reporting regimes for the GBR have been possible because the Inner Route 
where these regimes apply, pass through the internal waters or territorial sea of Australia. The 
system extended South to where the Inner Route passed into the EEZ, but Australia is now 




On 3 April 2010, the Chinese bulk carrier Shen Neng 1, carrying about 72,000 tonnes of coal, 
grounded at Douglas Shoal, About 50 miles north of Gladstone.37 This was outside the coverage 
of the mandatory ship reporting system for the GBR, which ends at latitude 22
o 
South about 120 
miles north of Gladstone. While only a small amount of bunker fuel spilt into the ocean, serious 
damage was caused to the reef with a scar 1.9 miles long and up to 820 feet wide. The ship‟s 
anti-fouling paint was also likely to cause coral poisoning. The ship‟s hull was seriously 
damaged with a number of ballast tanks and at least one fuel tank being breached. Fortunately 
the weather remained calm and the ship was refloated on 12 April after the bunker fuel had been 
transferred into a fuel lighter. 
 
See Figure 2 - Planned Route and Actual Track of Shen Neng 1 
 
The preliminary investigation showed that the accident occurred when the ship failed to turn at a 
way point that would have led the ship safely out through the Capricorn Group of islands and 
reefs. Human factors, including fatigue, distractions and lack of situational awareness were 
                                                 
37 The preliminary investigation into this incident is available at Australian Transport Safety Bureau,  “Grounding of the 
bulk carrier Shen Neng 1 at Douglas Shoal, Queensland”, Marine Occurrence Investigation No. 274,  MO-2010-003 
Preliminary, April 2010, www.atsb.gov.au 
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suspected causes of the grounding.38 The ship‟s master and chief officer, who was on watch at 
the time, were later arrested and charged with being liable for a vessel causing damage in a 
marine park.39 
 
The Shen Neng 1 incident highlighted the need for a reassessment of current measures to 
mitigate the risks associated with shipping activity in the GBR. As the coastal waters off 
Gladstone and around the Capricorn and Bunker group of islands are relatively open and not 
navigationally complex, it was decided that a compulsory pilotage scheme for the area was not 
warranted. Rather action is being taken to extend the current coverage of REEFREP to the 
southern boundary of the GBRMP as soon as the requisite traffic equipment could be put in 
place.40 As this would extend the REEFREP Ship Reporting System (SRS) area beyond 
territorial waters into the EEZ where the high seas freedoms of navigation apply under 
UNCLOS, it was appropriate to submit the proposal to the IMO for approval. The relevant 
submission was lodged with the IMO on 23 April 2010.41It was addressed by IMO‟s Sub-
Committee on the Safety of Navigation in July 2010 and will be considered for adoption by the 
Maritime Safety Committee in late November 2010.42 
 
See Figure 3 – Extension of REEFREP Mandatory Ship Reporting 
 
Under the International Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, coastal States may only 
implement mandatory ship reporting systems in their territorial sea and inland waters. Canada 
has recently been accused of ignoring this principle with its implementation of a mandatory 
reporting requirement for foreign and domestic shipping passing through Canada‟s Arctic 
waters.43 While this unilateral action by Canada has been disputed, there are no indications so far 





                                                 
38 Keith Wallis, “Fatigue led to Shen Neng 1 grounding”, Lloyd’s List, 15 April 2010, 
www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/regulation/article6954.ece 
39 Tom Arup, “Crew arrested over reef crash”, The Age (Melbourne), 15 April 2010, www.theage.com.au/.../crew-
arrested-over-reef-crash-20100414-se6l.html 
40 Australian Government, Improving Safe Navigation in the Great Barrier Reef, Canberra: Australian Maritime Safety 
Authority, April 2010, p. 10 
41 IMO Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, “Amendments to the existing mandatory Ship Reporting System in the 
Torres Strait and the Inner Route of the Great Barrier Reef: 
“, IMO document NAV 56/3/6, 23 April 2010. 
42 Advice from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority 8 September 2010. 




The precautionary principle is widely accepted in Australian legislation, including in the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), the major piece of 
national environmental legislation, and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1997.44 Both the 
Australian Government and the governments of the states and territories would be open to strong 
public criticism if they were not both proactive and precautionary in their actions to protect and 
preserve the marine environment. 
 
Australia‟s position on PSSAs and associated measures, as well as on marine environmental 
protection more generally, reflect the markedly increased international concern for the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment that has become apparent over the past twenty years 
or so. This concern was very clear in the 1998 Report by the Independent World Commission on 
the Oceans, entitled The Ocean – Our Future,45 and continues to be evident in forums such as the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 and the on-going United Nations Open-
ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea. 
 
Greater concern for the marine environment is the most significant development in oceans 
management and policy that has occurred over the last two decades. As a consequence of this 
concern, the freedoms of navigation are no longer the same, or as unrestricted, as those that 
prevailed in the more laissez-faire environment of the 1970s when UNCLOS was being 
negotiated. We see this in measures restricting freedom of navigation in various parts of the 
world, including in Europe and North America. At the heart of the matter are issues related to 
what the eminent Canadian international lawyer, the late Douglas Johnston, described as the 
“greening” of the law of the sea.46 But this remains a contentious issue because others can see 







                                                 
44 Lorne K. Kriwoken, Liza D. Fallon and Donald R. Rothwell, “Australia and the precautionary principle; Moving 
from international principles to domestic and local implementation” in Donald R. Rothwell and David L. Vanderzwaag, 
Towards Principled Oceans Governance – Australian and Canadian approaches and challenges, London: Routledge, 
2006, p. 183. 
45 Independent World Commission on the Oceans, The Ocean – Our Future (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
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